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 Reforming the Regulation of Household Waste Collection Services in Ireland: the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Commission Study 
By 
Paul K Gorecki* 
Abstract 
In 2019 the Department with responsibility for household waste (HHW) policy in Ireland will commence 
a review of its 2012 Policy. That review – as anticipated in the 2012 Policy – will rely on the research and 
analysis of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) on the state of competition in 
the HHW sector and on its policy guidance/recommendations. The CCPC’s 2018 study draws attention to 
a number of shortcomings in the HHW sector’s performance. It recommends a national economic 
regulator, not the appropriate market design (i.e. the status quo, side-by-side competition, which is 
evolving into a series of geographic unregulated monopolies; competitive tendering; and/or price 
control).  Market design is delegated to the regulator.   The description and analysis of the CCPC 
concerning the HHW sector should be relied upon by the Department in its review.  There is, however, 
no need for a national economic regulator and all the associated costs, which no doubt will be passed 
onto households.  Competitive tendering administered by local authorities with advice from the Office 
of Government Procurement, the CCPC and others, is the preferred market design and regulatory 
structure. 
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I INTRODUCTION1 
The collection of household waste (HHW) in Ireland is a private sector activity. Individual households 
contract with private operators for the provision of the service.2  Subject to fulfilling certain regulatory 
requirements any private operator can enter the HHW collection market and by offering better terms 
and conditions – competing on the merits - persuade households to switch their HHW provider from an 
existing operator (i.e. side-by-side competition).  The State provides the environmental and economic 
regulatory framework within which HHW operators compete.  On 27 June 2017 statutory measures 
requiring a form of pay by weight pricing were announced to provide incentives for households to 
generate less HHW and segregate more of it for recycling. This pricing structure was intended to replace 
flat rate pricing used by most operators under which households had little or no incentive to reduce 
HHW.3 There was, however, a potential drawback with the new pay by weight pricing structure. It could 
lead to an increase in HHW bills.  Indeed, the spectre of ‘price gouging’ was raised.4   
A Price Monitoring Group was set up in July 2017 to report on HHW charges as the new pricing structure 
was introduced.5 The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) was requested in 
September 2017 to conduct a market study on the HHW sector to,  
assess the nature and scale of consumer and operator issues in the household waste collection 
market and consider if the introduction of an enhanced regulatory regime could efficiently address 
these issues, in the short and long term.6  
The CCPC study recommended the establishment of a national economic regulator. The regulator would 
issue economic licenses for HHW operators, have the power to control prices, levy fines and determine 
the appropriate market design for each separate geographic market it identified. The CCPC study did not 
recommend a particular market design: side-by-side competition; price regulation; and/or competitive 
tendering. 
The Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment (the Minister), whose remit includes 
HHW, welcomed the publication of the CCPC’s study on 28 September 2018.7 However, the Minister did 
not endorse the CCPC’s idea of a national economic regulator, but he did agree with the CCPC’s rejection 
of the view that one market design was appropriate for all geographic markets: “different competition 
                                                          
1
 Unless otherwise stated the Introduction relies on CCPC (2018, pp. 3-7).  
2
 In other words, in contrast to other jurisdictions HHW collection is not funded in Ireland through local authority 
property taxes. 
3
 The pay by weight system introduced has, it appears, created limited incentives to reduce HHW, since charging by 
weight only comes into effect after a pre-defined allowance or threshold has been reached. The threshold has 
been set at a high level.  For details see CCPC (2018, para. 3.34) and CCMA (2018, p. 18). 
4
 Price gouging, which may also be referred to as excessive pricing, might already have happened given the 
presence of geographic monopolies in some markets.  
5
 For details see https://www.dccae.gov.ie/en-ie/environment/topics/waste/the-householder-and-
waste/household-waste-collection/price-monitoring-group/Pages/Price-Monitoring-Group-.aspx.  
6
 The full terms of reference are set out in CCPC (2018, Appendix A). The more detailed terms of reference were 
divided into four parts: research on current HHW issues; an economic assessment of the HHW market; an overview 
of HHW collection in other countries; and, recommendations. 
7
 DCCA&E (2018). 
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models can be introduced for different geographic areas.”8 The purpose of this paper is to critically 
examine the findings of the CCPC study and the key recommendation as to market design. 
Section II provides a brief summary of the CCPC study, together with a short commentary.  The current 
waste management policy of the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment’s 
(DCCA&E) is set out in A Resource Opportunity (2012 Policy).  In Section III it is argued that it is 
inappropriate for the CCPC (2018, para. 5.21) to uncritically accept as a binding constraint the 2012 
Policy position which rules out competitive tendering as the appropriate market design.   
The consensus view, including the CCPC, is that the HHW sector is evolving towards a series of 
unregulated monopoly operators.  This, it is argued in Section IV, will rule out side-by-side competition, 
leaving competitive tendering as the preferred market design.  
Context matters in framing future policy.  The CCPC recommends ex ante regulation of HHW collection 
based on an application of a cumulative threefold test to the current side-by-side market structure.  
However, Section V finds that this conclusion is critically dependent on the assumed market structure: if 
the threefold test is applied to a market structure characterised by competitive tendering then none of 
the three tests is satisfied.  In short, there is no justification for ex ante regulation with respect to 
competitive tendering.  
Section VI reflects on the implications of the analysis contained in this paper for the forthcoming review 
of HHW policy by the DCCA&E. Competitive tendering, with the tendering administered by local 
authorities with advice from the Office of Government Procurement, the CCPC and others is the 
preferred market design and regulatory structure.  Such tendering is a much better alternative than the 
current side-by-side model, which is in any event, moving towards a series of monopoly providers. HHW 
collection charges should be more attractive as monopoly rents are eliminated.  CO2 emissions and 
congestion costs will be reduced as there will be no inefficient duplication of services.  Finally, 
mechanisms can be introduced that complement competitive tendering so as to ensure that HHW 
collection charges do not get too high in low density areas, thereby protecting positive externalities of 
broader take-up of HHW collection services. 
II THE CCPC’s HHW STUDY 
2.1 The Study 
The CCPC study is divided into five chapters, plus a series of appendices. Chapter 1 briefly outlines the 
motivation, the remit, the methodology and existing HHW policy.  The CCPC conducted a public 
consultation (summarised in Appendix C), and, inter alia, commissioned an econometric report that 
examined the competitive pressure that the current structure exerts on HHW collectors (Appendix B), 
market research on the consumer experience with HHW collection (Appendix E) and a survey of ten 
national competition authorities in other European Union Member States on the operation of HHW 
collection in those jurisdictions.9 
Chapter 2 is concerned with market structure. Evidence of economies of scale (i.e. average cost falls as 
volume increases) and density (i.e. the greater the density of households in a given geographic area the 
                                                          
8
 DCCA&E (2018). 
9
 The ten are: Estonia, France, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK. 
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lower the cost of collection per household) are cited. The minimum efficient size for a HHW collector is 
estimated at 5,000 households.  The CCPC (2018, para. 2.20) concludes that HHW collection at the local 
level “is a natural monopoly.”  Local authority HHW markets are highly concentrated. There are high 
barriers to entry due to economies of scale and density.  Incumbents can selectively price cut should a 
new operator enter the market. Furthermore operators in adjacent geographic markets are unlikely to 
enter each other’s market due to the fear of retaliation. A tacit no poaching understanding is reached.10  
New entry is thus unlikely, given the difficulty and uncertainty of getting households to switch 
providers.11  On the other hand, exit and consolidation is the norm: the number of HHW operators in 
Ireland declined from 82 to 63 between 2012 and 2016.  This trend is expected to continue.   
In discussing market structure the CCPC notes that internationally competitive tendering rather than 
side-by-side competition is the norm for HHW market design. It is also observed that side-by-side 
competition exacerbates the impact of barriers to entry compared to competitive tendering.  The cost of 
entry is much lower when the market design is competitive tendering.  All HHW collectors are placed on 
the same footing when making a bid for the market. An international waste operator informed the CCPC 
that it was deterred from entering the Irish HHW market due to the current side-by-side market 
design.12  
The regulatory and enforcement environment is the subject of Chapter 3.  The 2010 Programme for 
Government stated that the Government,  
will introduce competitive tendering for local waste collection services whereby local authority and 
private sector collection firms would bid to provide waste collection services in an entire local 
authority area, for a given period and to a guaranteed level of service, including a public service 
obligation in respect of a waiver scheme for low income households.13  
A Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) was subsequently undertaken in 2012 by the DCCA&E which 
involved, for example, a careful comparison of the costs of HHW collection in Cork (side-by-side 
competition) and Belfast (competitive tendering).14  The RIA results are summarised in some detail in 
the CCPC study. 
The RIA compared three market design options: do nothing (i.e. side-by-side competition); restructure 
the market via competitive tendering; and, retain current market structure, enhance regulation (e.g. 
customer charter). Using eight criteria, including minimising price, market stability and competitive 
sustainable industry, the RIA scored these three options, respectively, as follows: 40; 81.5; and 76.15  The 
                                                          
10
 For a discussion of tacit collusion and how it can lead to supra competitive prices (i.e. rents) being earned while 
at the same time being immune from the remit of competition policy see Ezrachi & Stucke (2016, pp. 56-60). 
11
 This may be exacerbated if households are subject to annual contracts. 
12
 It is not at all clear that a careful evaluation was undertaken by the DCCA&E of the different market designs as 
local authorities withdrew from HHW collection and the private sector stepped in to provide such services. 
13
 CCPC (2018, p. 30). Note that local authority HHW operators were in the process of exiting the market. 
14
 For details see DEC&LG (2012a). It should be noted that the DCCA&E has undergone a number of name changes 
but the current name is used to cover all earlier incarnations. 
15
 Restructuring the market via competitive tendering scored more highly that retain current market structure, 
enhanced regulation on five of the eight criteria, the same on two and lower on one (i.e. “Market stability, 
regulatory certainty”).  It should be noted the results reported in the text refer to the “Weighted Score.” For 
details see CCPC (2018, pp. 29-31) and on the weighting, the next footnote.  
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maximum score is 95.16 However, the RIA then introduced a “Problematic Implementation Scenario,” 
which changed the scoring: 40; 72; and 76, respectively. Hence the RIA recommended the third option, 
due to problems of moving from the current side-by-side model to the optimal market design of 
competitive tendering.  This conclusion was subsequently endorsed in the 2012 Policy.  
The CCPC also reviews in Chapter 3 its own involvement in the HHW sector.  It notes that despite a 
number of allegations concerning anticompetitive behaviour that there was insufficient evidence to 
commence enforcement proceedings.  Mergers in the HHW sector have, nevertheless, been subject to 
the CCPC’s remit.  However, the CCPC argue that given the combination of natural monopoly and high 
barriers to entry there is little that ex post intervention can accomplish and that the alternative ex ante 
approach is more appropriate. 
The consumer perspective is presented in Chapter 4. The econometric report commissioned for the 
CCPC (2018, para 4.5) found “monopolistic tendencies.”  Reference is again made by the CCPC (2018, 
para. 4.7) to the ongoing exit of HHW operators, increasing concentration “which will allow monopoly 
providers to increase their charges.” A significant number of households have no access to a HHW 
collection service, which the CCPC suggests is due low route density resulting in higher collection costs. 
However, the vast majority of these households transport their waste to collection points.  Switching 
HHW operator was not an option for 18 per cent of households nationally and 25 per cent in the Dublin 
region.  Switching rates for HHW operators were slightly lower than other utilities.  Consumer 
complaints spike when policy changes occur such as the 2017 introduction of the pay by weight pricing 
mandate.  
Conclusions and recommendations constitute Chapter 5.  The CCPC lists eleven characteristics of the 
HHW collection market.  Many have been identified above, ranging from the fact that the HHW 
collection market is a natural monopoly to no service being available to many households.  These 
characteristics signal a market that is not performing well for consumers.  Furthermore matters are not 
expected to get better.  The CCPC (2018, para. 5.14) sees the HHW “market … moving towards a service 
provision of unregulated monopoly operators.” So much for the problem; what about the solution? 
The CCPC considers that the HHW side-by-side model in Ireland meets the criteria set out in the 
methodology employed to analyse certain telecommunications markets to determine whether or not 
they should be subject to ex ante regulation: high barriers to entry; a market which does not tend 
towards effective competition; and, insufficiency of competition law alone to address the market 
failures.  Having decided that ex ante regulation is the correct approach the CCPC (2108, para. 5.21) 
eliminates the option of competitive tendering as the preferred market design on the following grounds,  
This study shows that internationally, the prevailing approach to private provision of household 
waste collection services is through competition for the market. However, decisions to date in 
Ireland have not chosen this route.  Therefore, this study’s recommendations are made in the 
context of previous Government decisions and the range of prevailing market conditions, including 
markets with side-by-side competition, monopoly providers and areas of no service. 
                                                          
16
 The unweighted maximum score is 80 (i.e. a maximum of 10 per each of the eight criteria). However, the RIA 
considered that three criteria were especially important (environmental objectives; price; and, system stability) 
and instead of a weight of 1 they were given a weight of 1.5, resulting in a maximum of 95. For details see DEC&LG 
(2012a, pp. 95-96). 
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The CCPC then makes the specific recommendations concerning the creation of a national economic 
regulator with the remit set out in Section I.  It is also important for the regulator to collect data and 
conduct analysis including at the level of individual collection routes.  In areas where there is a 
monopoly provider the CCPC (2018, para. 5.25, iii) suggests that one option would be “targeted 
competitive tendering for certain areas,” while in order to increase the availability of HHW collection a 
cross-subsidy is proposed.17  
2.2 Commentary 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The CCPC’s description and analysis of the HHW market in Ireland is consistent with the results of the 
earlier analysis of the Competition Authority (2005),18 Ireland’s development agencies (Forfas, 2007), 
the OECD’s (2008) examination of public services in Ireland and the international review on waste policy 
commissioned by the DCCA&E (Hogg, et al, 2009). The CCPC usefully updates and extends the earlier 
analysis by highlighting, for example, the continuing exit of collectors from the HHW sector as it 
undergoes further consolidation and evolution towards a series of unregulated local monopolies.  There 
is one area where, however, the CCPC departs strongly from these earlier studies which favoured 
competitive tendering: 19 the CCPC specifically rejects that as the preferred market design, instead 
leaving questions of market design to the proposed national economic regulator.  
While the main focus of this paper is on the question of appropriate market design and the associated 
issue of regulatory structures, the CCPC study raises a number of other issues that merit comment. 
2.2.2 Competitive Constraints? 
The CCPC is undoubtedly correct that HHW collectors in adjacent geographic areas are unlikely to 
compete vigorously with each other.  They are likely to reach some kind of tacit arrangement.  However, 
given that HHW collectors can easily expand into adjacent geographic areas at quite low – perhaps even 
zero - marginal cost, if a HHW waste collector provides particularly poor unsatisfactory service then 
neighbouring HHW collectors may consider independently entering the poorly performing collector’s 
market.  The fact that this collector has suffered reputational damage will make it more difficult for it to 
retaliate against the collectors with the better reputation. Hence there might be some, albeit limited, 
mechanisms that limit poor performance.  
2.2.3 Regulatory Costs 
In terms of the creation of a national economic regulator the CCPC does not provide any costing. This is 
an important issue.  Typically sector regulators in Ireland are funded through a levy on the regulated 
entities.  Some or all of this is passed on to consumers.  The proposed national economic regulator will 
have, as noted above, an extensive programme of work delimiting appropriate geographic markets, 
selecting the operators and so on.   HHW operators will make representations during this process, the 
                                                          
17
 The CCPC (2018, para. 5.25, iii) wording is somewhat different: “Creating markets by combining less 
commercially viable areas with more commercially viable areas, thereby increasing the provision of household 
waste collection service.” 
18
 The Competition Authority was merged with National Consumer Agency in October 2014 to form the CCPC. 
19
 For details see Competition Authority (2005, para. 3.21), Forfas (2007, p. 16), OECD (2008, pp. 335-6) and, Hogg 
et al (2009, pp. 58-9). 
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costs of which will no doubt be reflected in HHW charges.  Furthermore if a license is taken away from 
an incumbent legal action may follow.  
2.2.4 Universal HHW Collection & Cross-Subsidy 
In raising the issue of a cross subsidy via the combining of a geographic area with a commercially viable 
HHW collection service with an area where collection service is a less or not viable, the CCPC study 
identifies the important issue of securing access for all households to a HHW collection service at 
reasonable cost.  Such universal service is likely to result in broader environmental benefits in that there 
is assurance that all households dispose of HHW waste in an appropriate manner and have the correct 
incentives to minimise waste.  The incidence of households that illegally burns their waste or dispose of 
the waste in some other unregulated manner (e.g. fly tipping) is likely to be reduced.20 
At the present time there is considerable variation in the degree to which HHW collection services are 
used by households.  Table 1 for 2015/16 presents, by local authority and waste region, the percentage 
of occupied households that avail of the services of a HHW collector (collection or participation rates).  
In several instances the data suggest something close to universal use of a HHW collector: DLR, Fingal, 
South Dublin, Louth, Galway City and Cork City all have collection rates between 90 and 100 per cent.  At 
the other end of the spectrum Donegal has a collection rate of only 28 per cent.  In between are local 
authorities such as Kerry, Kilkenny, Offaly and Cavan which have collection rates around 50 per cent.  
Overall the collection rate for Ireland, according to the CCMA (2018, p. 7), is 72 per cent. 
The CCPC (2018, para. 4.9) argues, not unreasonably, that population density is an important factor in 
determining collection rates.  In low density local authorities HHW collection charges may be prohibitive 
and hence there is limited HHW collection services compared to the much more densely populated local 
authorities that can realise economies of density.  In order to investigate the matter further we present, 
in Table 2, collection rates for the six most urban (i.e. high density) and six most rural (i.e. low density) 
local authorities in Ireland. Apart from Dublin City Council all the urban local authorities have collection 
rates between 92 and 99 per cent suggesting universal service provision.21  In contrast, although the 
rural local authorities have on average lower collection rates – 59 per cent vs. 93 per cent – what is 
striking is the variance of collection rates.  The most rural local authority, Leitrim, has a collection rate of 
83 per cent, while the sixth, Monaghan comes in at 72 per cent, while Donegal is 28 per cent.22  
This suggests that there are factors at work in determining household collection rates that are 
independent of household density.23  In the case of Leitrim, for example, the CCMA (2018, p. 8) 
                                                          
20
  CCPC (2018, para. 4.12) estimates 3 per cent of households dispose of their waste in an unregulated way. For 
further discussion see DEC&LG (2012a, pp. 42-45).  
21
 The data in Table 2 refer to occupied households that have a HHW kerbside collection service.  In some instances 
households may use bags especially in the inner city where streets are narrow, houses front on to the street with 
have no rear access and/or there are other limitations on storage.  According to the EMWR (2015, p. 87), 
“[H]ouseholders availing of a bag collection service are not currently registered with a service provider as bags are 
purchased at retail outlets.  This makes it difficult to estimate how many of these households avail of a paid 
service.” It appears that this is one of the reasons for the much lower collection rate reported in Table 2 for Dublin 
City compared with the other local authorities in the left hand column in the table. 
22
 But Donegal has, according to CCMA (2018, p. 8), “a very high distribution of Civic Amenity sites.” 
23
 The CCMA (2018, p. 9), for example, gives the following examples: no go estates; and, operational 
considerations, such as roads not suitable for collection vehicles. 
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comment the local County Council introduced bye-laws “making it mandatory to join a collection service 
and they did reach 83% participation from a low of just over 50%.” More recently bye-laws have been 
introduced across the State by local authorities,  
obliging consumers to participate in an authorized waste collection service or provide 
documentary proof on what alternative means they use to dispose of their waste and 
encouraging greater segregation of waste to reduce volumes of residual waste collected.  
This means that from now on, every household must be able to prove that they have a 
contract in place with an authorized waste collector or that they regularly use a civic 
amenity site or recycling center.24  
This is likely to lead to a further boost in the levels of households availing of HHW collection as 
compared to those in Table 1. 
Table 1 




%  households 
served by HHW 
collector 
Area %  households 
served by 
HHW collector 
Area %  households 









Carlow 64 Cavan 54 Dublin City 74 
Clare 61 Donegal 28 Dun Laoghaire 
Rathdown (DLR) 
99 
Cork City 98 Galway City 92 Fingal 98 
Cork Co 57 Galway Co 62 South Dublin 97 
Kerry 51 Leitrim 83 Kildare 84 
Kilkenny 50 Mayo 59 Laois 59 
Limerick 65 Monaghan 72 Longford 79 
Tipperary 66 Roscommon 48 Louth 96 
Waterford 78 Sligo 71 Meath 72 
Wexford 76 - - Offaly 55 
- - - 
- 
Westmeath 74 
- - - 
- 
Wicklow 53 
Note: the number of occupied houses is based on CSO data is for 2016; the total number of houses using kerbside 
collection using National Waste Collection Permit Office annual returns is for 2015.  There are 31 local authorities 
(i.e. 26 County Councils; three City Councils - Cork, Dublin & Galway; and two City and County Councils – Limerick 
and Waterford). 
Source: CCMA (2018, pp. 7-8). 
Delivering universal service with uniform prices in the face of a variation in costs can be achieved 
through the CCPC’s suggested cross-subsidy between households in one geographic area.  An argument 
against such a cross subsidy is that it raises the price of collection in the commercially viable area and 
lowers the price in the area where service is less viable. Thus some households in the former area may 
be priced out of the market, while more of those in the latter area will avail of HHW collection. 
However, it is not clear how much weight should be attached to such an argument in the context of 
HHW collection.  After all even in local authority areas which can be characterised as rural collection 
rates reach 83 per cent.   
                                                          
24
 https://www.mywaste.ie/my-household-waste-bye-laws/.  
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Table 2 
Households Served With a HHW Collection Service, by Urban & Rural Local Authorities, 2015/16
 
Local Authority 







  % households 










%  households 
served by HHW 
collector 
(collection rate) 
Cork City 100 98 Leitrim 89.3 83 
Dublin City 100 74 Galway Co. 77.8 62 
Galway City 100 92 Roscommon 73.2 48 
Dun Laoghaire 
Rathdown (DLR) 
98.8 99 Donegal 72.7 28 
South Dublin 98.0 97 Mayo 71.4 59 
Fingal 92.7 98 Monaghan 70.7 72 
Average  93 Average  59 
Note: collection rates are derived from Table 1; the per cent of the population in town areas refers to towns with a 
population of more than 1,500, while rural areas refers to the per cent of the population not in towns (i.e. 
population of town areas less than 1,500 persons).  The town/rural split is for 2016 and is based on the Census of 
Population for that year. 
Source: CCMA (2018, pp. 7-8) and Central Statistics Office, Census of Population.  
Any adverse impact of the cross subsidy could be offset by the introduction of waivers for poorer 
households.25  Such households are most likely to be sensitive to any HHW collection price increase.  
Wavier systems existed prior to the withdrawal of local authorities from HHW collection.  If linked to an 
existing benefit that targeted low income households then this is likely to minimise administrative costs 
and could be applied on a State-wide basis.26 Any waiver system should incorporate pay by weight 
incentives so as to incentivize households to minimise waste.27  
Furthermore, as argued in Sections III to VI, competitive tendering is a better market design than the 
current side-by-side model.  By eliminating rents and needless duplication of services, HHW charges are 
likely to lower than they otherwise would be: using the comparison between Cork (side-by-side 
competition) Belfast (competitive tendering) as an example would see a 30 per cent reduction in HHW 
charges.  Such a reduction would go a considerable way to offset the impact of any cross subsidy on 
HHW charges.   
Increased utilisation of HHW collection can and is being achieved by a variety of methods.  Obliging 
households to verify that their waste is being disposed of in an appropriate manner is likely to increase 
HHW collection rates.  Universal service provision – by making HHW collection available in areas where 
hitherto this has not been the case – is also likely to increase collection rates.  However, the universal 
service provision needs to be complemented by waivers for low income households which are likely to 
be particular sensitive to any increase in price implied by the cross-subsidy occasioned by a universal 
                                                          
25
 According to CCMA (2018, p. 10-11) only Limerick City and County Council operate such a scheme at the present 
time. In 2017 the DCCA&E (2017) an annual support of €75 was announced for persons with lifelong/long-term 
medical incontinence.  The importance of waivers was reduced as the local authorities withdrew from HHW 
collection (DEC&LG (2012a, p. 56). 
26
 A starting point might include those qualifying for the General Medical Services scheme. 
27
 HHW collector’s charges are often a two part tariff: a fixed and variable charge with the latter reflecting pay by 
weight.  Hence a waiver system could reduce if not abolish the fixed part of the tariff (since that does not 
incentivized waste reduction/recycling) and retain either in whole or in part the variable charge, which is the pay 
by weight component.   
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service obligation.  The introduction of competitive tendering by lowering HHW charges below what 
they would other otherwise be also encourages greater use of HHW collection by moderating the impact 
of any cross subsidy on HHW charges.28  
III   IMPLEMENTATION RISKS AND THE CCPC’s DEFERENCE TO THE 2012 POLICY 
3. 1 Introduction 
The CCPC defers to the 2012 Policy in rejecting competitive tendering as the preferred market design, 
instead recommending a national economic regulator.  It is, of course, important in making policy 
recommendations to take into account existing policy.  However, it is not at all clear why the CCPC 
should regard the 2012 Policy as a binding constraint.  It begs the obvious question: why request the 
independent agency to address issues in the HHW sector if it is going to unquestioningly accept current 
policy?  There is nothing, for example, in the CCPC’s (2018, Appendix A) broad terms of reference which 
would explain such a limitation.  An examination of the 2012 Policy is thus merited to determine 
whether or not the underlying rationale that it puts forward for rejecting competitive tendering was and 
is still valid. If the answer is in the affirmative then the CCPC’s deference is appropriate.   
3.2 The Regulatory Impact Analysis: Implementation Risks29 
The DCCA&E’s commissioned RIA into HHW concluded that competitive tendering “scores highest under 
optimal implementation conditions, however should implementation be problematic, side by side 
competition provides a superior mix of outcomes.” This would be a particular problem “during this 
difficult phase of the economy’s development (p. 105).” In each case the RIA outlines the risk and then 
assesses it. 
The RIA raises two sets of implementation risks.  The first set is confined to implications of tendering for 
smaller and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  Here the RIA argues that SMEs,  
may be disadvantaged, relative to their larger counterparts, due to the difficulties they may have 
in assembling the managerial and corporate expertise required to effectively engage with a 
somewhat complex [competitive] tendering process (p. 100).   
Furthermore, although the RIA acknowledges that the purpose of HHW regulation “is not to support 
employment amongst inefficient service providers (p. 101),” it is nevertheless the case if the existing 
SMEs are unsuccessful in competitive tendering then “the simultaneous collapse of several household 
waste collection companies [will] result in a strong negative impact on the local economy (p. 102).” 
The second implementation risk was summarised as follows: “[T]he current industry may be unwilling to 
engage in an altered market structure and may take actions to obstruct change (p. 102).” The RIA 
pointed out that the HHW sector was against the introduction of competitive tendering and that since 
local authorities had withdrawn from HHW, local authorities were not in a position to be providers of 
last resort.  A number of possible tactics by HHW collectors to thwart the successful operation of 
competitive tendering were outlined including a boycott (i.e. a service provision strike).  The RIA did, 
however, point out that such a collective boycott would require considerable trust amongst the HHW 
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 It might also be easier to administer any waiver programme under competitive tendering where there is only 
one HHW collector per franchise area. 
29
 Unless specified otherwise all page references in this section are drawn from DEC&LG (2012a). 
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collectors, and “may, in practice, be unachievable, as the benefits to an individual firm of clandestinely 
breaking ranks could be massive (p. 102).” Also, as the RIA points out, if non-indigenous firms engaged in 
the bidding for tenders then it would self defeating for indigenous firms to boycott the tendering 
process. 
In terms of future policy options the RIA stated that there should be a review of HHW policy in 2016. 
Furthermore the RIA stated that should “it be deemed necessary, Government may then opt to alter the 
regulatory regime, including by introducing [competitive tendering] or by otherwise monopolising 
household waste collection services (p. 107).” 
3.3 2012 Policy 
The 2012 Policy echoes the RIA. It notes that HHW is a critical service and that interruptions in HHW 
collection can have an adverse impact of public health.  Reference is made to SMEs “may be 
disadvantaged by the introduction of [competitive tendering], relative to their larger counterparts, 
particularly during the current economic climate which may also undermine future levels of 
competition.”30 Enhanced regulatory measures included making it compulsory for all households to 
demonstrate they are either availing of a HHW collection service or otherwise disposing of the waste in 
an acceptable manner.  The CCPC was requested to monitor the new regulatory regime and report by 
2016 when a formal HHW policy review would be taken.  
3.4 The CCPC Study 
The CCPC (2018, para. 3.23) did not report in 2016 due to lack of data, but did report in 2018.  On 8 May 
2019 the Minister, in response to a Parliamentary question on whether or not he would adopt the 
recommendations in the CCPC’s study, stated that later in 2019 a review of the 2012 Policy would be 
initiated in which account would be taken of the CCPC study in developing waste policy on issues such as 
market structure.31  
3.5 Commentary 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The commentary on the RIA and 2012 Policy can be divided into two parts: whether or not the 
implementation risks are sufficiently grave to overturn the RIA’s initial conclusion that competitive 
tendering is the optimal market design; and, whether or not there are good reasons for the CCPC to take 
as a given the RIA and 2012 Policy. They are, of course, related to each other.   
3.5.2 Competitive Tendering: Implementation Risks? 
There are several cogent reasons for arguing that the weight accorded to implementation risks by the 
RIA and the 2012 Policy is unwarranted. 
First, the nature of the implementation risk is highly conditional.  The RIA, as noted above, poses the 
issue in terms of “should implementation be problematic,” not that it will. Second, in evaluating the risks 
themselves the RIA presents no supporting data or evidence, in contrast to much of the rest of the RIA.  
For example, reference is made in the RIA to the impact on local unemployment of the simultaneous 
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 DEC&LG (2012b, p. 30). 
31
 For details of the PQ see https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-05-08/1207/#pq_1207.  
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collapse of several HHW operators. However, no evidence is provided on: the likely simultaneously 
failure of multiple HHW operators in the same local area; the likely size of any employment loss; the re-
employment rates of those unemployed; the local and national labour market unemployment rates; 
and, the loss of employment in HHW compared to the total employment in the local employment area.  
Attention would also need to be paid to any offsetting increase in the demand for local goods and 
services, given that competitive tendering will likely lower HHW collection charges.  Households can 
then spend the resulting increase in their real income on other local goods and services.  
Third, the RIA and the 2012 Policy were developed against the backdrop of the Great Recession.  
Economic conditions were grim: the unemployment rate in July 2012, the month the RIA was published, 
was 15.6 per cent, while GNP remained unchanged between 2011 and 2012.32 Hence it is perhaps 
understandable that in framing policy there was a concern over economic conditions and, in particular, 
unemployment.  However, when the CCPC was requested to conduct its study in September 2017 
unemployment had fallen to 6.6 per cent, a year later to 5.6 per cent, while the 2017/2018 GNP growth 
rate was 6 per cent. Hence it would appear that fears concerning unemployment and local labour 
markets are of much less if any relevance to-day in framing HHW policy.33 
Fourth, the RIA argued that SME’s might be disadvantaged in bidding for tenders under a competitive 
tendering system. However, if it can be demonstrated that this is the case and that having such firms 
participate in competitive tendering would substantially increase the degree of competition and thus 
lead to lower HHW collection charges, there is nothing to prevent measures being introduced to 
facilitate SME participation.  In the awarding of the 3G telecom licenses in the UK, for example, great 
attention was paid in the auction design to ensure that new entry could spur competition in the bidding 
(Binmore & Klemperer, 2002). 
3.5.3 CCPC Deference Merited? 
There are several reasons why the CCPC should not have accepted the 2012 Policy’s position based on 
the underlying research in the RIA, in addition to those set out above, as a binding constraint with 
regard to competitive tendering as the preferred market design.  
First, the RIA in recommending side-by-side competition together with enhanced regulation specifically 
mentioned the possibility of competitive tendering being introduced as a result of any future policy 
review.  At that time it was anticipated this would occur in 2016, instead the review will be initiated in 
2019.  Hence the option of competitive tendering as the preferred market design was considered to be a 
credible option in any future policy review. 
Second, the objective of competition and consumer protection policy should provide the guiding 
principle for the CCPC in making recommendations.  According to the CCPC’s 2015-2018 strategic 
statement, “Our vision is for open and competitive markets where consumers are protected and 
                                                          
32
 See: https://www.cso.ie/multiquicktables/quickTables.aspx?id=mum01 for seasonally adjusted monthly 
unemployment rates.  Annual GNP in constant markets prices was kindly supplied by Kieran McQuinn of the 
Economic and Social Research Institute. 
33
 It is not entirely clear that this risk should be addressed through HHW policy.  Labour market demand is best 
dealt with aggregate demand policy, while supply side issues through training, wage subsidies and so on. Trying to 
use one policy instrument to address several different objectives is often a recipe for failing to attain any of the 
objectives. 
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businesses actively compete.”34  In the Irish League of Credit Unions case the Supreme Court also set out 
the goal of competition policy: 
106. The entire aim and object of competition law is consumer welfare. Competitive markets must 
serve the consumer. That is their sole purpose. Competition law, as is often said, is about 
protecting competition, not competitors, even if it is competitors who most frequently invoke it. Its 
guiding principle is that open and fair competition between producers of goods and services will 
favour the most efficient producers, who will thereby be encouraged to satisfy consumer demand 
for better quality products, wider choice and lower prices. Their reward is a greater market 
share.35 
This suggests that unless there is some express instruction to the contrary that the CCPC should be 
concerned with consumer welfare rather than issues related to local unemployment or the alleged 
difficulties SME’s may have competing due to lack of size. 
Third, apart from the unlikelihood of incumbent HHW collectors successfully boycotting any competitive 
tender process for reasons set out in the RIA, there is another important for discounting this risk: 
collective action by incumbent HHW collectors is likely to be a prima facie breach of the Competition Act 
2002.  The CCPC, for example, in providing guidance to what trade associations may and may do under 
competition law, stated:  
 A collective boycott, organised between competing undertakings in order to place pressure on … a 
buyer, is a form of output limitation, and thus, a restriction of competition by object. In its 
enforcement work, the [CCPC] has encountered many circumstances in which competitors are 
alleged to have colluded in a collective boycott.  Where such allegations are proven, the [CCPC] 
takes the view that significant consumer harm is likely to result, and therefore, prevention and/or 
punishment of collective boycotts is a key enforcement priority of the [CCPC].36   
For a restriction by object case to be successful in Court only requires demonstrating that the boycott 
took place; there is thus no requirement to show that consumers are worse off as a result, it is 
presumed because of the inherently anti-competitive nature of the agreement.37 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
In sum, the implementation risks identified in the RIA and endorsed by the 2012 Policy do not stand up 
to critical scrutiny. The RIA’s initial finding that competitive tendering is the optimal market design 
stands.  Furthermore, there are additional reasons for the CCPC not to accept the 2012 Policy and the 
accompanying RIA as a binding constraint in making policy recommendations.   
 
 
                                                          
34
 CCPC (2015, p.4). This strategy statement was in place when the CCPC prepared its study. However, there was no 
change in the CCPC’s vision in its 2018-2020 strategy statement. 
35
 Competition Authority –v- O’Regan & Ors [2007] IESC 22. 
36
 Competition Authority (2009, para. 4.20), footnotes omitted. 
37
 For further discussion see Andrews, Gorecki & McFadden (2015, pp. 94-97) and Whish & Bailey (2018, pp. 119-
126). 
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IV HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: UNREGULATED MONOPOLIES  
Policy should be forward looking.  It should to the maximum extent possible take into account 
reasonably anticipated developments. The terms of reference for the CCPC’s study specifically refer to 
the long term.  In the case of HHW collection one important future consideration is the evolution of 
market structure.  A consistent theme of both the RIA and the CCPC study is ongoing reduction in the 
number of HHW collectors and the resultant consolidation.38 This reflects, in part, economies of scale 
and density. These are structural characteristics that are enduring features of the market. The upshot is, 
as the CCPC correctly states, that the market is moving towards “unregulated monopoly operators.”  
The corollary of this is the side-by-side competition will no longer exist, except at the boundaries 
between the unregulated monopoly providers.  No longer will it be the case – as occurs on the street I 
live on in Dublin City – that two or more HHW collectors provide service along the same street.39  This 
suggests that the national economic regulator favoured by the CCPC will either have to regulate the 
price charged by the monopoly operator or introduce some form of competitive tendering.  In earlier 
research the Competition Authority (2005, paras. 3.9-3.14) considered the merits of both and rejected 
the former option. That discussion need not be rehearsed here. 
V  CONTEXT MATTERS: FRAMING THE REGULATORY DEBATE 
5.1 Introduction 
The findings of the analysis in this paper to date are twofold that:  
 the RIAs initial finding that competitive tendering is the optimal market design stands, the 
implementation risks should be discounted; and, 
 the market structure of the HHW sector is evolving towards a series of unregulated monopolies, 
which as the CCPC (2018, para. 4.7) states, “will allow monopoly providers to increase their 
charges.”  
This raises the question of whether, if the market structure were competitive tendering, the application 
of the three criteria used to the CCPC to determine whether or not ex ante regulation was required 
when the market structure was side-by-side competition, would also result in recommending ex ante 
regulation.  It should be noted that all three conditions need to be satisfied in order to justify ex ante 
regulation; the conditions are thus cumulative.40 
5.2 Competitive Tendering: Definition 
It is first, of course, necessary to specify what is meant by competitive tendering.  The RIA defined 
competitive tendering as follows: 
In a franchise bidding system, a local authority … issues a tender the winner of which will be the 
sole provider of household waste collection services, under contract, in accordance with a given 
service level, for a given period of time, and for a given geographic area, i.e. a local market. In 
simple terms, an auction is held for the right to deliver a service on a monopoly basis. It is during 
this auction when competition occurs, as the bidding firms compete to win the tender by offering 
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 See, for example, DEC&LG (2012a, p. 12). 
39
 Indeed, the number has already declined from three to two. 
40
 European Commission (2007, para. 14). 
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bids. The successful bidder is the firm which offers the lowest combination of price to the 
householder and/or meets the service quality standards.41 
The RIA recognises local authorities are the most appropriate administrative unit to conduct the 
tendering, which is consistent with the practice elsewhere.42 The local authority is likely to have 
information and knowledge concerning local conditions and preferences that are hard for a national 
economic regulator in Dublin to replicate.43  The CCPC (2018, para. 2.30) has concluded in a number of 
merger cases that local authority areas are the relevant geographic market.   
In order to minimise the costs of bidding and so attract the maximum number of bidders to the extent 
possible the information made available to bidders by local authorities should be in common format, the 
nature of the contractual terms and conditions should be the same and the service characteristics 
similar.  The contract length should be sufficient that the bidders can recover any sunk costs. 
The tender can also be structured to meet various environmental objectives, including waste 
segregation, pay by weight charging, mandatory reporting of illegal dumping and universal service 
provision.44 There are likely to be fewer collection vehicles under competitive tendering resulting in 
lower CO2 emissions and less congestion, especially in urban areas. Furthermore, if the geographic area 
included in the local authorities tenders covers all households then this will constitute a universal 
service obligation, given that a uniform price.  If the tender is structured with penalties for non-
compliance then local authority has a higher degree of control over the industry as compared to side-by-
side competition.45 
In some cases it may make sense for local authorities that are contiguous to one another to organise a 
joint competitive tender.46  Advice on the tendering process could be provided to local authorities by the 
Office of Government Procurement (OGP).47  No doubt the OGP would call upon the expertise of local 
authorities in Northern Ireland, other parts of the UK which are familiar with HHW tendering48 and 
elsewhere.  Furthermore the expertise of the CCPC could also be called upon to ensure that tenders are 
structured in such a way as to reduce the opportunities for successful bid rigging by HHW operators. 
Thus there would be no need for a national economic regulator. 
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 DEC&LG (2012a, p. 62). Footnotes omitted. 
42
 CCPC (2018, para. 3.14). Furthermore, local authorities in Ireland were responsible for HHW collection before 
they withdrew in favour of the private sector.  
43
 For example, the CCMA (2018, p. 2) point out that “high density collection would have a one compartment truck 
collecting one waste type and would collect up to 880 lifts in 5 hours.” In contrast, “the rural route collection would 
be a compartmentalised vehicle collecting several waste streams simultaneously and would only collect up to 260 
lifts in 9 hours.” Hence in combining geographic areas with different household densities the implications of 
different collection vehicle configurations would need to be taken into account, perhaps leading to somewhat 
different collection frequencies.  
44
 CCPC (2018, para. 3.6). 
45
 CCPC (2018, para. 3.17) and CCMA (2018, p. 16). 
46
 At one point the four Dublin local authorities combined the tender for the provision of green bin collection 
services for dry recyclables. 
47
 For details see: https://ogp.gov.ie/.  One of the aims of the OGP is to encourage SMEs, hence mitigating one of 
the implementation risks.   
48
 See, for example, OFT (2006). 
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5.3 Competitive Tendering: High Barriers to Entry? 
The first criterion that has to be satisfied for ex ante regulation is the “presence of high and non-
transitory barriers to entry,”49 is not attained under competitive tendering. Barriers to entry are low to 
medium as compared to the high barriers to entry under side-by-side competition.  But on what basis 
can such a conclusion be reached when the same non-transitory economies of scale and density are 
present? The answer revolves around the nature of competition. Under side-by-side competition, for 
reasons set out above, incumbents likely reach tacit agreements and understandings not to compete 
with rivals in adjacent geographic markets, while the ability to selective price cut combined with 
economies of scale and density, discourages new entrants.  
Under competitive tendering or what is sometimes referred to as competition for the market, 
competition takes place for the right or the contract to supply the HHW collection service as specified in 
the tender documents.   The incumbent has few if any advantages over new entrants, provided that 
enough reliable market information is provided to bidders – and the OGP and the local authority would 
have a strong interest in ensuring this condition is met.  Reaching and enforcing tacit understandings as 
to which collectors would win particular tenders would be much more difficult for the same reasons 
outlined above concerning an incumbent boycott of any attempt by the State to introduce competitive 
tendering. 
In effect under competitive tendering the right to service all households in a given geographic area are 
simultaneously available to the successful bidder.  The entry cost is that of preparing the bid and 
ensuring the infrastructure necessary to deliver the service is available.  The corollary for side-by-side 
competition is the cost acquiring the local authority client list when the local authority withdrew from 
HHW collection.  Although the client list acquisition costs are typically not available due to concerns over 
business secrets in some cases this is not the case: Country Clean paid Cork City Council between €166 
and €180 per household for client lists in 2010/11.50 In the case of Dublin City Council with 140,000 
households it is difficult to image that the tender costs are going to be anywhere near €22.4 million to 
€25.2 million.51  Of course, once the HHW collector becomes the incumbent then under side-by-side 
competition any new HHW collector has to sign up each new customer household by household.  
5.4 Competitive Tendering: Lack of Effective Competition?  
The second criterion that has to be satisfied for ex ante regulation is that “market structure … does not 
tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon.”52 The evidence suggests that this 
condition is not met. There are three (and maybe more) classes of bidders: collectors that currently 
serve a series of geographic markets in Ireland; others with a more local or regional focus;53 and, 
international bidders which, as noted above, have been reportedly discouraged from entering the Irish 
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 CCPC (2018, p. 62). 
50
 DEC&LG (2012a, p. 99). 
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 i.e. 140,000 x €166 = €22.4 million; 140,000 x €180 = €25.2 million. 
52
CCPC (2018, p. 62).  
53
 The Irish Waste Management Association, the representative body whose members account for 75 per cent of 
HHW, present details of HHW operators by geographic location: http://iwma.ie/household-waste/iwma-members-
in-your-area/.  
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market due to its side-by-side nature (i.e. the costs, difficulties and uncertainties of ensuring enough 
existing households switch so as to make entry profitable). Incumbent HHW operators are likely to have 
developed expertise in competitive bidding or tendering in various commercial waste streams,54 while 
international bidders would often also be familiar with HHW tendering.55  As noted above, the use of 
common tenders and standard documentation lowers the costs of bidding and hence is likely to 
encourage more rather than fewer bidders.  
The second aspect is the likely impact of competitive tendering in terms of prices compared to side-by-
side competition, especially as it evolves into a series of local monopoly providers.  Here the evidence is 
solid. The RIA summarises it as follows:  
Firstly, international experience suggests that contracting out provides best value for money and is 
generally less costly than in-house provision. Secondly, where competition in the market is 
compared, it is more expensive than either public or private provision on a monopoly basis. Lastly, 
municipalities which contract out waste collection have control over the environmental impact of 
the waste collection provision, a factor which is noted in many of the articles referenced.56 
The RIA’s comparison of HHW waste charges between Cork – side-by-side competition – and Belfast – 
competitive tendering, found that for Cork the annual per household charge was €312.45, for Belfast, 
€219.67.57  Thus the cost saving is 30 per cent.  
5.5 Competitive Tendering: Insufficiency of Competition Law? 
The third criterion that has to be satisfied for ex ante regulation is that the “insufficiency of competition 
law alone to adequately address the market failure(s) concerned.”58 Again the criterion is not met.  
There are a number of ways in which firms can thwart the impact of competitive tendering and thus 
lead to market failure. The most obvious is for potential bidders to agree beforehand to allocate bids 
amongst themselves, with the resultant risk that price will exceed cost, where cost includes a normal 
rate of return.  In other words, rents are being earned.  
As noted above given the diversity of firms bidding for the contracts successful bid-rigging is 
problematic.  However, notwithstanding that, such bid-rigging is a by object prohibition under the 
Competition Act 2002. Hence collectors run the risk of criminal prosecution resulting in fines and/or jail 
sentences.59  Potential bidders should be made aware of these consequences by the OGP and the local 
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 See, for example, M/09/024 – Greenstar/Veolia (Ireland) (paras. 3.36, 3.45-3.49, & 5.18). 
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 This will also apply to some existing HHW collectors in Ireland since some local authorities procured green bin 
collection through tendering such as Dublin City Council.  Currently apartment complexes might, for example, 
secure waste collection through tendering. 
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 DEC&LG (2012a, p. 40) 
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 DEC&LG (2012a, p. 85).  The RIA comparison makes a number of adjustments to ensure that like to being 
compared to like. 
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 CCPC (2018, p. 63). 
59
 This needs to be qualified in view of the recent bid-rigging case involving commercial flooring. The defendants 
pleaded guilty faced with compelling evidence that the CCPC had assembled.  The subsequent Court decisions, at 
both trial and on appeal, however, employed an inappropriate methodology for determining the sanction 
lessening the effectiveness of competition enforcement.  For further details see Gorecki (2017, 2019).  On the 
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authorities and advice should also be sought from the CCPC as to the optimal timing of bids so as to 
minimise the opportunity for successful bid-rigging.  
On merger control there is always the danger that especially aggressive bidders could be acquired by 
incumbents to prevent such mavericks from disrupting any tacit or formal market place agreements. 
Again the Competition Act 2002 prohibits mergers that substantially lessening competition.  Ireland has 
a compulsory notification merger regime, but as the CCPC (2018, para. 3.50) study points out 
the majority of mergers and acquisitions which occur in the household waste collection sector 
involve small operators whose turnover falls under the CCPC’s merger notification thresholds and 
thus, are not required to be mandatorily notified.  
However, under the Competition Act 2002 the Minister responsible for competition policy may specify a 
class of mergers that has to be notified to the CCPC irrespective of the turnover.  To date the only class 
of such mergers are media mergers.60  However, there is no reason in principle why it could not be 
extended to cover HHW collection. 
The CCPC has conducted merger reviews involving leading HHW collectors: M/09/024 – 
Greenstar/Veolia(Ireland); and, M/16/008 – PandaGreen/Greenstar.  If there were competitive concerns 
over below threshold acquisitions by these HHW collectors then it is possible for the merger to be 
cleared by the CCPC subject to the merged entity voluntarily notifying all such mergers to the CCPC so 
that a competition assessment can be conducted prior to any such merger being implemented. Such a 
condition was, for example, included in M/04/051 – Grafton/Heiton and M/18/067 – LN-Gaiety/MCD 
Productions. 
It should be noted that merger control is ex ante not ex post while if dominant firms were to abuse their 
market position by in some way trying to prevent the successful operation of the tendering system, then 
the CCPC could seek an injunction halting such activity, again very close to ex ante intervention.  
In sum, there is no justification for ex ante regulation using the CCPC’s threefold test.  This conclusion is 
strengthen by the CCPC (2018, para. 5.17) study’s observation that “regulation … is only undertaken as a 
last resort due to actual or expected market failure.” 
VI CONCLUSION 
The DCCA&E is to commence a review of its 2012 Policy in 2019. That review – as anticipated in the 2012 
Policy – will rely on the views of the CCPC in terms of the state of competition in the HHW sector and 
policy guidance based in its recommendations. The CCPC views are set out in its 2018 study on the HHW 
sector in which it recommends a national economic regulator but not the appropriate market design.  
The description and analysis of the CCPC concerning the HHW sector should be relied upon by the 
DCCA&E. There is, however, no need for a national economic regulator and all the associated costs, 
which no doubt will be passed onto households.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
CCPC’s enforcement with respect to the behaviour of the HHW sector to the introduction of pay by weight see 
Gorecki (2016), which related to the events described in CCPC (2018, paras. 3.29-3.33). 
60
 Andrews, Gorecki & McFadden (2015, pp. 272-4). 
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Competitive tendering administered by local authorities with advice from the Office of Government 
Procurement, the CCPC and others is the preferred market design and regulatory structure.  Such 
tendering is a much better alternative than the current side-by-side model, which is in any event, 
moving towards a series of monopoly providers. HHW collection charges should be more attractive as 
monopoly rents are eliminated.  CO2 emissions and congestion costs will be reduced as there will be no 
inefficient duplication of services.  Finally, mechanisms can be introduced that complement competitive 
tendering so as to ensure that HHW collection charges do not get too high in low density areas, thereby 
protecting positive externalities of broader take-up of HHW collection services. 
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